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The Effects of Threats to Meaning on Attitudes Toward Evolution 
 
Paige Garwood, Lauren Janness, Joshua Stafford, Sabrina Hakim, and Lauren Wade 
Daryl R. Van Tongeren (Faculty Sponsor) 
   Hope College 
Introduction 
 
Humans have an innate need to make sense of the world—to give it 
meaning  (Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006).  We create and reaffirm this 
sense of meaning through cultural worldviews (Solomon, Greenberg, 
& Pyszcynski, 2004).  
 
Threats to our meaning cause existential anxiety, and to protect 
ourselves from this existential fear, we reject, eliminate, or avoid 
threats to our cultural worldviews (Schmeichel & Martens, 2005).  In 
addition to these actions, when our meaning is threatened, we are 
provoked to compensate by showing aggression towards those who 
are dissimilar (Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & 
Lyon, 1989).   
 
Most pertinent to the current study, when our meaning is threatened, 
we bolster our cherished beliefs or meaning systems as a way of 
regaining meaning (Van Tongeren & Green, 2010). That is, meaning 
threats intensify our original beliefs and can make us more defensive.  
 
Science and religion are two prominent cultural worldviews that can 
provide meaning.  Some individuals, particularly those high in 
religious fundamentalism, may perceive the science and religion as 
incompatible and competing meaning systems (Poling & Evans, 
2004) .  
 
Thus, we predicted that following a meaning threat, participants high 
in religious fundamentalism would report a less favorable attitude 
toward evolution than those low in religious fundamentalism as a 
way of reaffirming their original beliefs.  
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Results 
 
Because we predicted that those high in religious fundamentalism would report 
more negative attitudes toward evolution than following a meaning threat relative 
to those low in religious fundamentalism, we: 
 1. combined the affirmation and neutral condition into a “no threat  condition” 
         and 
 2. examined the interaction between religious fundamentalism and priming 
 condition on attitudes toward evolution.   
 
The interaction between meaning threat (vs. non-meaning threat) prime and 
religious fundamentalism was significant, β = 1.70, SE = .30, t = 3.30, p = .002. 
Although religious fundamentalism was unrelated to critique of evolution in the 
absence of a meaning threat (β = -.14, p = .361), when meaning was threatened, 
greater religious fundamentalism was related to stronger critique of evolution, β = 
.67, SE = .23 t = 3.52, p = .001.  
 
Further comparisons revealed that the meaning threat marginally increased 
critique of evolution for participants high in religious fundamentalism (+1 SD), β 
=.32, SE = .52, t = 1.91, p = .061, whereas it significantly reduced critique of 
evolution for participants low in religious fundamentalism (-1 SD), β = -.44, SE = 
.50, t = -2.62, p = .010. That is, the meaning threat elicited attitude polarization on 
views of evolution depending on one’s degree of religious fundamentalism.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Method 
 
Participants (n = 55; 17 males and 37 females) were self-identified 
Christian undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory psychology 
course at a small, private liberal arts college in the Midwest. Participants 
first completed the Religious Fundamentalism Scale (RFS; Altemeyer, & 
Hunsberger, 1992).  
 
Next, they were randomly assigned to one of three priming conditions:  
 1. a meaning threat induction (i.e., writing about the ways in which 
their life lacked meaning) 
 2. a meaning affirmation induction (i.e., writing about the ways in 
which their life is full of meaning), or  
 3. a neutral control condition (i.e., writing about their plans for next 
week).  
 
Following this, participants read an essay purportedly from Nature that 
detailed how a recent archeological discovery has provided mixed 
evidence for the theory of evolution—some scientists view this as 
evidence in support of evolution and other scientists view this discovery 
as undermining previously valid evidence for evolution.  
 
Finally, participants responded to a series of questions about the essay. 
Four items (α = .77) were averaged to form a “critique of evolution” 
index, such as “I am interested in learning more about the positions that 
criticize or critique evolution” and “The essay provided strong, convincing 
evidence against evolution.” 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
There was an interaction effect demonstrating that religious fundamentalists were 
more critical of evolution when their sense of meaning was challenged, and those 
low in religious fundamentalism were less critical of evolution.  Given that religious 
fundamentalists have been found to hold negative attitudes toward evolution (Poling 
& Evans, 2004), meaning threats may enhance these negative attitudes as a way of 
regaining meaning. On the other hand, those low in religious fundamentalism 
viewed evolution more positively following a meaning threat. These results 
highlight that, following threats to meaning, individuals bolster different sources of 
meaning that are aligned with their values, presumably to regain meaning in life. 
Furthermore, it highlights how negative attitudes toward evolution may be fueled by 
a desire to maintain meaning in life, at least for those high in religious 
fundamentalism.  
